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1SWIPT Massive MIMO Systems with Active
Eavesdropping
Mahmoud Alageli, Aissa Ikhlef, Senior Member, IEEE, and Jonathon Chambers, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the optimization of the downlink
transmission for simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) in multi-cell massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems. The system comprises a two-antenna
active energy harvester (EH) which is capable of legitimately
harvesting energy via one antenna, and illegitimately and actively
eavesdropping the signal intended for certain information user(s)
(IU(s)) via the other antenna for the purpose of information
decoding or energy harvesting. Thereby, the considered problems
are: 1) when the EH eavesdrops for the purpose of information
decoding, i.e., the EH is information-untrusted by the base
station (BS), we propose to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate
under a constraint on a worst-case average harvested energy
(AHE); 2) when the EH eavesdrops one or multiple IUs for
energy harvesting, i.e., the EH is information-trusted by the
BS, we propose to maximize the sum-rate of the IUs under a
constraint on a worst-case AHE by the EH. We derive asymptotic
expressions for a lower bound on ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) and
AHE in large system limit. Then, we use these results to optimize
the power allocation for downlink SWIPT transmissions which
include: information signals, artificial noise (AN) and energy
signal towards the IUs, legitimate and illegitimate antennas of
the EH, respectively. Simulation results show the accuracy of
our asymptotic analysis. We show that there is a performance
tradeoff between the worst-case ESR and the worst-case AHE.
In addition, the impact of the combined legitimate/illegitimate
operation of the EH on the SWIPT performance is evaluated.
Index Terms—SWIPT, massive MIMO, active eavesdropping,
legitimate and illegitimate energy harvesting, physical-layer se-
curity, secrecy rate, beamforming, artificial noise
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, with the emerging standardizations of
the Internet of Things (IoT), far-field wireless power transfer
(WPT) has been of significant importance as a source of
energy for remote energy constrained wireless devices such as
those related to IoT technologies and wireless sensor networks
(WSNs). Far-field WPT in multi-user systems always intro-
duces information security problems as a result of the nature of
the broadcast channel. An example of such systems is referred
to in the literature as simultaneous wireless information and
power transfer (SWIPT) systems in which the transmitter
(base station (BS)) supports multiple energy harvesting users
(EHs) and multiple information users (IUs). Such systems are
expected to show degraded secrecy performance particularly
when the EHs actively attack the channel estimation phase for
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the purpose of information decoding. One of the active eaves-
dropping attacks is known as the pilot spoofing attack [1], in
which during the uplink channel estimation, the eavesdropper
(EV) transmits a copy of the training sequence of a certain
IU such that the BS estimates the uplink composite channel
coefficients of the IU-EV pair of users, and consequently part
of the downlink signal intended for the IU will be directed (via
downlink beamforming) toward the EV. A pilot spoofing attack
is similar to pilot contamination in multi-cell massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) systems [2] except that in the
spoofing attack the EV can intentionally control its received
leakage information power by controlling its active training
power.
Throughout the literature, to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, the optimized transmission for a SWIPT system with
pilot spoofing attack has not been considered. However, there
has been research that explores new signal processing methods
to enhance the information-secrecy in the presence of a pilot
spoofing attack [1], [3]–[9]. The recently developed signal
processing algorithms consider recovering network security
either by: 1) improving the processing of the signal (which
might include the information and/or artificial noise (AN))
transmission [1], [3]–[7]; 2) or by improving both the pro-
cessing of the signal and the training sequence transmission
[8], [9]. The work in [8] considered a MISO setup with an IU-
(active EV) pair. Secure transmission is achieved via a two-
way training-based scheme in which the transmitter estimates
both the IU and the EV channels, then feeds forward the IU
with its uplink channel estimate followed by the downlink
training sequence. Therefore, the IU can calculate another
estimate of its own channel, which will be fed back to the
transmitter. Based on the channel estimates available, the
transmitter can obtain a better channel estimate by using the
uplink and the feedback estimates. This was exploited to
improve the optimized downlink beamforming with a secrecy
rate objective. The same system setup was considered in [3],
however, the EV can decode the information signal and jam the
IU in full-duplex mode using two different antenna subsets. In
the same way, the transmitter tackles that by jamming the EV
using a subset of its antennas, while the remaining antennas
are used for information signal transmission. The optimal
ratio of transmit/receive antennas was derived to maximize
the achievable secrecy degrees of freedom.
WPT and SWIPT with passive EV(s) have been considered
for massive MISO/MIMO systems [10]–[17]. The work in
[12] considered SWIPT with no secrecy aspect for a massive
MIMO system. The harvested energy of the IUs will be
used next for uplink training and decoding information si-
2multaneously via splitting the received power. The considered
problem was to jointly optimize two sets of variables, power-
splitting ratios and the power allocation per IU, to maximize
the minimum achievable rate of all the IUs. The variables
were optimized alternately. The authors in [15] studied the
effect of phase noise (at the BS and user antennas) on the
IU’s information rate and EH’s harvested energy in a massive
MIMO system and showed that the secrecy rate decreases as
phase noise variance increases, while the harvested energy by
the EH is not affected. WPT has been considered in [16]–[18].
In [18], the authors demonstrated the impact of having a large
transmit antenna array on the harvested energy by a single
antenna EH. For matched filter (MF) transmit beamforming,
it was proven that any loss in the harvested energy at the EH
due to the decrease in the downlink transmit power can be
compensated by increasing the number of transmit antennas.
We consider in this paper SWIPT for massive multi-cell
MIMO system that comprises multiple single antenna IUs
and dual antennas EH which can act as legitimate and active-
illegitimate. The EH (located at the reference cell) uses one of
its antennas (legitimate antenna) to harvest energy legitimately,
while the other antenna (eavesdropping antenna) is used to
eavesdrop the information signal of one or multiple IUs. This
requires that the EH splits its available channel estimation
training power between its own orthogonal training sequence
sent from the legitimate antenna, and a copy of the training
sequence(s) of the attacked IU(s) sent from the eavesdropping
antenna. Therefore, the estimated channel of the attacked IU(s)
will be correlated with the eavesdropping antenna channel,
consequently, this will strengthen the received information
signal power by the active-illegitimate EH.
The main contributions of our work are as follows: 1)
We provide closed form expressions (in terms of statistical
channel state information (SCSI)) for ESR and average har-
vested energy (AHE) in large system limit. Such asymptotic
analysis is challenging, particularly for a system suffering
from instantaneous dependencies between the user’s channel
vectors and the beamforming vectors in one cell and across
different cells due to pilot contamination and active eavesdrop-
ping; 2) To tackle the excessive active eavesdropping, unlike
conventional AN beamforming [4], [19], we introduce a new
design of AN signal such that its jamming effect is directly
proportional to the training power invested by the illegitimate
active EH, i.e., the larger the eavesdropping training power,
the larger the jamming received power at the eavesdropping
antenna of the EH; 3) We design an algorithm to optimize
the downlink power allocation among the information, AN
and energy transmit signal vectors toward the IUs, legitimate
and eavesdropping antenna of the EH, respectively. For the
information-untrusted EH case, the power allocation aims to
maximize the worst-case ESR under a constraint on the worst-
case AHE by the EH, while for the information-trusted EH, the
considered problem is to maximize the IUs’ ergodic sum-rate
under a constraint on a worst-case AHE; 4) More importantly,
we introduce a new concept of illegitimate energy harvesting
which is based on active eavesdropping for the purpose of
energy harvesting. The illegitimate EH can maximize its
harvested energy by optimally splitting its training power
between its own legitimate training sequence and other IUs’
training sequences; 5) We provide complexity analysis of the
proposed algorithms.
Related Work: The concept of secure SWIPT has been
studied for conventional MIMO/MISO systems in [20]–[23].
In [22], the authors proposed AN-aided SWIPT in a MISO
system comprising a single IU and multiple untrusted EHs.
The considered problem was the maximization of the worst-
case secrecy rate of the IU while maintaining a minimum
level of individual harvested energy by each EH. The design
in [22] was extended in [23] to consider sum secrecy rate
maximization for multiple IUs. Latterly, the secure SWIPT
design was extended to massive MIMO systems in [13]–[15].
In [13], the authors considered secrecy and energy efficiencies
in massive MIMO enabled heterogeneous cloud radio access
network (C-RAN). The power gain of the channels from the
remote radio heads (RRHs) to the IU and the passive EV
are known. The contribution of [14] was to optimize the
downlink transmission covariance matrix of the IU in a wire-
tap massive MIMO system. The ergodic secrecy rate of the
IU under a constraint on the harvested energy by the passive
EH was considered. In [15], the authors studied the secrecy
performance of SWIPT massive MIMO system when the
uplink training is affected by phase noise. The secure SWIPT
in the previous works assumed no active eavesdropping. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge, optimizing the downlink
transmission in an actively wire-taped massive MIMO system
has not been studied before. In particular, we assume that
the EH employs two antennas, the first antenna is used to
illegitimately eavesdrop information signal, while the second
antenna is used to legitimately harvest energy. The EH can
control splitting the transmit training power between the
legitimate and illegitimate antennas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model including the channel estimation,
downlink transmission and the derivation of the worst-case
ESR. Section III provides some random matrix theory results
and the large system analysis for the worst-case ESR and
the AHE. In Section IV, we present the power allocation
optimization for both information-untrusted and information-
trusted EH cases. In Section V, we provide the complexity
analysis of the proposed algorithms. Simulation results and
evaluations are given in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VII.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by boldface lower case letters
and matrices by boldface upper case letters. IN , 1M and
0m×n denote the N×N identity matrix, M×1 vector with all
entries one and the m× n zero matrix, respectively. diag(S)
is a column vector whose entries are the diagonal entries of
matrix S. S ≻ 0 indicates that S is a positive definite matrix.
ρ(S) gives the largest eigenvalue of matrix S. The operators
(·)T , (·)H , tr(·), log2(·), | · | and ‖ · ‖ denote the transpose,
conjugate transpose, trace of a matrix, logarithm to base 2, the
absolute value of scalars and the Euclidean norm, respectively.
‖[x1, ..., xM ]‖1 =
∑M
i=1 |xi|. Cm×n denotes the set of all
complex m× n matrices. x ∼ CN (0,Σ) denotes a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector x ∈ CN×1 with
zero mean and covariance matrix Σ. cov(x, y) and var(x)
3denote the covariance between the random variables x and
y, and the variance of x, respectively. {an} denotes a set
of all vectors indexed by n. {am,n}m denotes a set of all
scalars indexed by m. [f(N)]N→∞ = a and f(N)
N→∞→ a
are equivalent to limN→∞ f(N) = a and can be used
interchangeably. [x]+ = max (x, 0).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a multi-cell massive MIMO
system with a cell cluster of size L. Each cell consists of
a BS equipped with a large number of antennas N of order
of hundreds, M single antenna IUs interested in information
decoding, {IUl,i}, i = 1, 2, ...,M , where l ∈ {1, ..., L} is
the cell index. We assume that an active EH, equipped with
two antennas is located in the reference cell (indexed l = 1),
where one antenna is used to harvest energy legitimately,
while the other antenna is used for one of the following
two purposes: 1) to illegitimately and actively eavesdrop and
decode the information signal intended for a certain IU, IU1,i,
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, and in this case the EH is considered
as information-untrusted by the BS; 2) to illegitimately and
actively harvest energy from the information signal intended
for one or multiple IUs, and in this case the EH is considered
as information-trusted by the BS. For a massive MIMO
system, the assumption of single-antenna IU is reasonable
since the large dimensionality of transmit antennas can provide
a favorable propagation channel and the required diversity gain
at a simple, cheap, single-antenna IU’s device [24]. In addition,
the favorable propagation channels can perfectly eliminate
inter-user interference, therefore, the achievable capacity by
M single antenna IUs is equivalent to that of one M -antenna
IU [24]. The design of illegitimate spy devices (such as
our considered EH) does not have to be subject to accepted
standards and such devices can have an exceptional design
to ultimately achieve their desired goals. Such exceptional
designs for spy and malicious attack devices have been widely
adopted in the literature [3].
During the uplink training phase, the EH transmits a copy
of the training sequence(s) of the IU(s) under attack, {IU1,m},
{m} = M ⊆ {1, ...,M}, via its eavesdropping antenna
such that the BS estimates the uplink composite channel
coefficients — which are equivalent to the downlink channel
coefficients based on channel reciprocity in the time division
duplexing mode, TDD — of both {IU1,m} channel(s) and the
eavesdropping antenna channel of the EH. Consequently, part
of the downlink signal intended for the IU1,i will be directed
(beamformed) toward the EH.
Let hi,l,p = R
1
2
i,l,ph˜i,l,p denote the uplink channel vector
between the ith IU in the lth cell, IUl,i, and the pth cell’s BS
where h˜i,l,p ∼ CN (0, IN ) and Ri,l,p ≻ 0 is a Hermitian
Toeplitz matrix representing the spatial correlation between the
entries of hi,l,p. gEp = R
1
2
1,pg˜Ep denotes the uplink channel
vector between eavesdropping (illegitimate) antenna of the EH
and the pth cell’s BS, g˜Ep ∼ CN (0, IN ) and R1,p ≻ 0
denotes the spatial correlation between the entries of gEp .
gp = R
1
2
1,pg˜p denotes the uplink channel vector between
the legitimate antenna of the EH and the pth cell’s BS1,
g˜p ∼ CN (0, IN ).
The variations of the entries of h˜i,l,p, g˜Ep and g˜p give
a measure of small-fading coefficients, while path loss and
correlation between BS antenna elements are captured by
Ri,l,p and Rl,p. We assume that the variance of the channel
coefficient between the user and any of its local BS antennas
is γ1, and γ2 < γ1 to any of the neighbouring BS antennas.
Therefore, with the assumption that the EH and the IUs
experience statistically equal path loss, the scaling of the
correlation matrices satisfies
diag (Ri,l,p) , diag (Rl,p) =
{
γ11N , l = p
γ21N , l 6= p . (1)
A. Uplink Channel Estimation Under Active Attack
The user channels exhibit block fading, i.e., the channels
remain constant over a time block and change independently
from one block to another. Over each block, the transmission
occurs across two time slots for uplink training sequence
transmission and downlink signal transmission. The relative
division between the two time slots is not considered in this
paper, however, we assume a unit time slot for downlink
transmission as in [14], [22]. During the uplink training phase,
a pilot training is sent from each IU, {IUl,i}, with an average
power PI . The EH sends a copy of training sequence(s) of
the attacked IU(s) via its eavesdropping antenna using part of
its total average power φPE , 0 < φ < 1, while the remaining
training power (1−φ)PE is used for transmitting the legitimate
energy harvesting training sequence via the second antenna.
The training sequences of the IUs and legitimate EH in a
single cell are assumed to be orthogonal, but since the channel
coherence time is limited, the training sequences are reused
across all cells.
The signal at the pth BS received across τ training trans-
missions is
Y p =
L∑
l=1
M∑
i=1
√
PIhi,l,pψ
T
i + (1− φ)PEgpψTE+
∑
j∈M
√
φPE
|M| gEpψ
T
j +Np,
(2)
where Np ∈ CN×τ is the additive noise matrix with entries
following the distribution CN (0, σ2n). M is the set of IUs
eavesdropped by the EH and |M| is the cardinality of M.
ψi ∈ Cτ×1 and ψE ∈ Cτ×1 are the training sequences of
IUl,i, ∀l, and the legitimate antenna of the EH, respectively.
ψHi ψj 6=i, ψ
H
i ψE = 0; and ψ
H
i ψi, ψ
H
EψE = τ . The
minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of hi,p,p, hˆi,p,p
is given as
1Since the separation between the legitimate and illegitimate antennas of the
EH is much smaller than the distance from the EH to the BS’s antenna array
and local scatterers, the angles of arrivals of the signals from both antennas at
the BS’s antenna array are identical. This implies that the channel vectors gp
and gE,p experience the same spatial correlation between their entries [25],
[26].
4hˆi,p,p = Cp,i yp,i, (3a)
yp,i = τ
√
PI
L∑
l=1
hi,l,p + ατ
√
φPE
|M| gEp +Npψ
∗
Ii
, (3b)
Cp,i =
√
PIRi,p,p
(
τPI
L∑
l=1
Ri,l,p +
ατφPE
|M| R1,p + σ
2
nIN
)
−1
,
(3c)
where yp,i ∈ CN×1 is the projection of Y p onto ψIi , Cp,i ∈
C
N×N is the MMSE estimation matrix, α = 1 for i ∈ M
and α = 0 for i /∈M. The covariance matrix of hˆi,p,p is
RˆIi,p,p = E[hˆi,p,phˆ
H
i,p,p] = τ
√
PICp,i Ri,p,p. Similarly, for
the case of information-untrusted EH in which one IU, IU1,i, is
being attacked for information eavesdropping (i.e., |M| = 1),
the MMSE estimate of gE1 , gˆE1,i , is given as
gˆE1,i = Ci y1,i, (4a)
Ci =
√
φPER1,1
(
τPI
L∑
l=1
Ri,l,p + τφPER1,1 + σ
2
nIN
)−1
.
(4b)
The covariance matrix of gˆE1,i is
Rˆi = E[gˆE1,i gˆ
H
E1,i
] = τ
√
PECi R1,1. The estimation
of gp is not required since, as we will see later, we use
retrodirective beamforming [15]. The MMSE estimation
results in (3) and (4) follows from the standard linear
estimation theory [27], [28].
Remark 1: We assume that the reference cell’s BS blames
the information-untrusted EH for the active eavesdropping
attack. The BS has the ability to calculate the eavesdropping
training power by using the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Having N →∞, any illegitimate active training
power associated with the training sequence ψIi , can be
detected and calculated as
yH1,iy1,i − τ2PI
L∑
t=1
tr (Ri,t,1) +Nτσ2n
τ2tr (R1,1)
N→∞→
{
φPE
|M| , i ∈M
0, i /∈M ,
(5)
where all the scalars, vector and matrices in (5) are determin-
istic at the BS.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Alternatively, the detection of the active eavesdropper
is possible by averaging the difference covariance ma-
trix y1,iyH1,i − R¯i over some data blocks, where R¯i =(
τ2PI
∑L
l=1Ri,l,1 + τσ
2
nIN
)
and it is deterministic at the
BS [4]. In addition, we assume a perfect knowledge of the
SCSIs, {Ri,l,1} and R1,1, at the reference cell’s BS, which
is reasonable, particularly for the massive antenna array at the
BS [29].
B. Downlink Transmission
The pth BS employs transmit MF beamforming to direct
the information signal vector
∑M
i=1
√
Pp,i wi,p xi,p, toward
its local IUs, where Pp,i is the power allocated to IUp,i and
wi,p = hˆ
∗
i,p,p/‖hˆi,p,p‖, (6)
is a unit norm information beamforming vector for IUp,i
and xi,p is the information symbol intended for IUp,i, with
xi,p ∼ CN (0, 1). The information symbols are assumed to
be mutually independent. The reference BS directs the energy
signal vector w toward the legitimate antenna of the EH. The
energy signal is designed using retrodirective beamforming
[17] in which the reference BS retransmits an amplified
conjugated version of the received energy training sequence,
such that w =
√
Py∗/‖y‖, where
y = Y 1ψ
∗
E = τ
√
(1− φ)PE g1 +N1ψ∗E . (7)
For the information-untrusted EH case, the BS facilitates
secure information decoding at the attacked IU1,i and energy
harvesting at the EH simultaneously by directing the AN signal
vector
√
Pnwniz toward the EH
wni = gˆ
∗
E1,i
/‖gˆE1,i‖, (8)
where z ∼ CN (0, 1) is the AN symbol and Pn is the
power allocated to wni . With the new design approach for
the AN beamformer in (8), it can be noticed that the re-
ceived AN signal at the eavesdropping antenna of the EH,
Pn|gTE1 gˆ∗E1,i |2/‖gˆE1,i‖2, is directly proportional to the eaves-
dropping training power, φPE (since gˆE1,i ∝
√
φPEgE1 ).
Therefore, wni is able to tackle any excessive active eaves-
dropping, i.e., the larger the eavesdropping training power, the
larger the jamming received power by the EH.
Given that IU1,i is the IU being attacked, then the received
signals at IU1,i, yIi ; the legitimate antenna of the EH, y1i ;
and at the eavesdropping antenna of the EH, yEi , are
yIi =
L∑
p=1
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,j h
T
i,1,p wj,p xj,p +
√
P hTi,1,1 w
+
√
Pn h
T
i,1,1 wniz + nIi ,
(9)
y1i =
L∑
p=1
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,j g
T
p wj,p xj,p +
√
P gT1 w
+
√
Pn g
T
1 wniz + n1,
(10)
yEi =
L∑
p=1
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,j g
T
Ep
wj,p xj,p +
√
P gTE1 w
+
√
Pn g
T
E1
wniz + nE ,
(11)
where nIi , n1 and nE are zero mean σ2n variance complex
Gaussian noises at IU1,i, the legitimate and eavesdropping
antennas of the EH, respectively.
5C. Achievable Lower Bound on the Information User Ergodic
Rate
In massive MIMO systems with pilot contamination and
active eavesdropping, since the precoded channel hTi,1,1wi,1
is not known at IU1,i, we apply the method used in [2], [30]
to derive a lower bound on the ergodic rate. In particular, the
received information signal at IU1,i in (9) can be recast as
yIi =
√
P1,iE[a
(1)
i,i ] xi,1 +
√
P1,i
(
a
(1)
i,i − E[a(1)i,i ]
)
xi,1 + Zi,
(12)
where
Zi =
M∑
j 6=i
√
P1,ja
(1)
i,j xj,1 +
√
Pa1i +
√
Pnaiz + aˆi + nIi ,
a
(p)
i,j = h
T
i,1,p wj,p, a˜i = a
(1)
i,i − E[a(1)i,i ], a1i = hTi,1,1 w,
ai = h
T
i,1,1 wni and aˆi =
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,ja
(p)
i,j xj,p.
(13)√
P1,iE[a
(1)
i,i ]xi,1 is the desired signal received over
the deterministic average precoded channel E[a(1)i,i ]2.√
P1,i a˜i xi,1 =
√
P1,i(a
(1)
i,i − E[a(1)i,i ])xi,1 is the
beamforming uncertainty, which is the desired signal
over unknown channel to the information user.∑M
j 6=i
√
P1,ja
(1)
i,j xj,1,
√
Pa1i ,
√
Pnaiz and aˆi in Zi are
the reference cell inter user interference, energy signal, AN
signal and the interference from neighbouring cells at IU1,i,
respectively. Now, using Theorem 1 in [2], we have the
following lower bound on ergodic information rate at the
attacked IU, IU1,i
Ri = log2 (1 + SINRIi) , (14)
where
SINRIi =
P1,i
∣∣∣E [a(1)i,i ]∣∣∣2
P1,ivar
[
a
(1)
i,i
]
+ E
[
|Zi|2
] ,
var
[
a
(1)
i,i
]
= E
[∣∣∣a(1)i,i − E [a(1)i,i ]∣∣∣2
]
= E
[
|a˜i|2
]
.
(15)
D. Upper Bound on the EH Ergodic Rate
The received information signal of IU1,i at the eavesdrop-
ping antenna of the EH in (11) is recast as
yEi =
√
P1,ibi,1xi,1 +
M∑
j 6=i
√
P1,jbj,1xj,1 +
√
Pb
+
√
Pn bi z + bˆi + nE ,
(16)
where
2As N → ∞, E[ai,i] always converges to a positive real deterministic
value (see Appendix A).
bj,p = g
T
Ep
wj,p, b = g
T
E1
w, bi = g
T
E1
wni ,
bˆi =
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,jbj,pxj,p.
(17)
√
P1,ibi,1xi,1 is the desired received signal.∑M
j 6=i
√
P1,jbj,1xj,1,
√
Pb,
√
Pn bi z and bˆi are the reference
cell inter user interference, energy signal, AN signal and the
interference from neighbouring cells at the eavesdropping
antenna of the EH, respectively. In the following, we assume
that the EH has full knowledge of the IUs’ beamforming
vectors {wj,1} and its own channels {gE1 , g1}; and is
able to cancel the intra-cell interference. This results in an
upper bound on the EH ergodic rate. We state the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: For N → ∞ and assuming that the EH has
full knowledge of the IUs’ beamforming vectors and its own
channels; and is able to cancel the intra-cell interference, an
upper bound on the ergodic rate of the EH is given by
REi
N→∞→ log2 (1 + SINREi) , (18)
where
SINREi =
P1,iE
[
|bi,1|2
]
PE [|b|2] + PnE [|bi|2] + E
[∣∣∣bˆi∣∣∣2
]
+ σ2n
. (19)
Proof: See Appendix B.
E. Lower Bound on Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Based on the information rate bounds in (14) and (18), we
have the following lower bound of the ESR of the attacked
IU, IU1,i
RSi
N→∞→ [Ri −REi ]+ . (20)
It is worth noting that RSi represents the worst-case sce-
nario for the secrecy performance since we have a lower bound
on the IU ergodic rate and an upper bound on the EH ergodic
rate. As a result, achieving security for this worst-case scenario
implies achieving security for a more optimistic scenario [4],
[20].
F. Average Harvested Energy
Given a unit time slot for downlink transmission and an
equal energy harvesting efficiency for all users, 0 < ζ < 1,
the AHE by the EH depends on the attacked IU, IU1,i, and is
given as3
3Since the EH is information-untrusted by the BS, therefore, the energy is
considered to be harvested from the energy, AN and information signals. Also
considering AHE is reasonable since as N →∞, the total harvested energy
is dominated by its average [10].
6Ei =ζE

∑
j
P1,j |bj,1|2 + P |b|2 + Pn |bi|2 +
∣∣∣bˆi∣∣∣2


+ ζE

∑
j
P1,j
∣∣∣b˜j,1∣∣∣2 + P ∣∣∣b˜∣∣∣2 + Pn ∣∣∣b˜i∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣b¨i∣∣∣2

 ,
(21)
where
b˜j,p =g
T
pwj,p, b˜ = g
T
1w, b˜i = g
T
1wni ,
b¨i =
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
√
Pp,j b˜j,p.
(22)
For the case of information-trusted EH, the secrecy issue
is not relevant and the design aims to jointly improve both
the ergodic sum-rate,
∑
iRi and the AHE which depends on
the set of attacked IUs, M. The expression at the right-hand
side of (21) is still valid for calculating the AHE in this case.
The optimization of downlink power allocation is left to be
considered in section IV. In the next section, we consider the
large system analysis.
III. LARGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze and derive the asymp-
totic convergence of the expected values of the received
powers of the normalized transmit signals at the IUs
and the EH, E[{a(1)i,i , |a(p)i,j |2, |a˜i|2, |a1i |2, |ai|2, |aˆi|2}];
E[{|bi,p|2, |b|2, |bi|2, |bˆi|2}] and E[{|b˜j,p|2, |b˜|2, |b˜i|2,
|b¨i|2}], respectively, with the condition that the number of
transmit antennas is very large, i.e., N →∞. The assumption
of N →∞ is valid and commonly used in the massive MIMO
literature. It helps in simplifying the design and analysis of
massive MIMO systems. After obtaining the design parameters
using this assumption, the system’s performance can be tested
for the practical case of large but limited number of antennas
[3], [12], [17], [19].
A. Random Matrix Theory Preliminaries
Some random matrix theory results are used to calculate the
converged expected values of the received signal and interfer-
ence powers in terms of: correlation matrices {R1,p} = RE
and {Ri,l,p} = RI which include the channel path loss,
training powers PI , φPE and (1 − φ)PE ; allocated transmit
powers {Pp,j}, P and Pn; and the channel estimation matrices
{Cp,i} = CI and {Ci} = CE .
For evaluating the asymptotic values of the received signal
and interference powers we use Corollary 1 in [31] which is
quoted as:
Corollary 1: "Let A be a deterministic N × N complex
matrix with uniformity bounded spectral radius for all N . Let
q = 1√
N
[q1, ..., qN ] where the qi’s are i.i.d. complex random
variables with zero mean, unit variance, and finite eighth
moment. Let r be a similar vector independent of q. Then[
qHAq − 1
N
tr (A)
]
→ 0 and [qHAr]→ 0
almost surely as N →∞."
To make use of the above result, we need to investigate
the spectral boundedness of correlation matrices, channel
estimation matrices and their product. We have the following
lemmas.
Lemma 2: The spectral radii of the correlation matrices RE
and RI are upper bounded as
{ρ(R1,p)} ≤
{
γ1 , p = 1
γ2 , p 6= 1, {ρ (Ri,l,p)} ≤
{
γ1 , l = p
γ2 , l 6= p .
(23)
Lemma 3: The spectral radii of the channel estimation
matrices CI and CE are upper bounded as
{ρ(Ci,p)} , {ρ(Ci)} ≤ c ≤ ∞, (24)
where c is a positive real scalar.
Lemma 4: Let a finite set {Am} ⊂ {RI ,RE , CI , CE} and
∃Am ∈ {RI ,RE}, ∃Am ∈ {CI , CE}. Then, the spectral
radius of
∏
mAm is always bounded with a definite value,
ρ(
∏
mAm) <∞.
Lemma 5: Having the column vectors x = [Θ1x1 + · · ·+
ΘNxN ] and y = [Θ¯1y1 + · · · + Θ¯NyN ], where {xj} and
{yj} are statistically independent and follow the distribution
CN (0, IN ). Then, for an arbitrary matrix A independent of
{xj} and {yj} with ρ(A), ρ(Θj), ρ(Θ¯j) <∞, we have:
E
[∣∣xHAy∣∣2] N→∞→ tr(A E [yyH]E [xxH]AH) . (25)
The proofs of Lemmas 2-5 are provided in Appendix A.
B. Asymptomatic Analysis Results
Using the random matrix theory results in Subsec-
tion III-A and given that IU1,i is the attacked IU,
the expected values of the received signal powers at
IU1,i, E[{a(1)i,i , |a(p)i,j |2, |a˜i|2, |a1i |2, |ai|2, |aˆi|2}], and the
expected values of the received signal powers at the EH,
E[{|bi,p|2, |b|2, |bi|2, |bˆi|2}], asymptomatically converge to
definite values as in (27)–(28). For notational convenience,
we define
E
[{
a
(1)
i,i ,
∣∣∣a(p)i,j ∣∣∣2 , |a˜i|2 , |a1i |2 , |ai|2 , |aˆi|2
}]
=
{
a¯
(1)
i,i , a¯
(p)
i,j ,
¯˜ai, a¯1i , a¯i,
¯ˆai
}
and
E
[{
|bi,p|2 , |b|2 , |bi|2 ,
∣∣∣bˆi∣∣∣2
}]
=
{
b¯i,p, b¯, b¯i,
¯ˆ
bi
}
.
(26)
The detailed derivations of the asymptomatic analysis re-
sults in (27)–(28) are provided in Appendix C.
a¯
(1)
i,i
N→∞→ τ
√
PI tr (Γi,1) tr−
1
2
(
Rˆi,1,1
)
, (27a)
a¯
(p 6=1)
i,i
N→∞→[
τ2PI |tr (Γi,p)|2 + tr
(
Ri,1,pR˜
(1)
i,p,p
)]
tr−1
(
Rˆi,p,p
)
, (27b)
a¯
(p)
i,j 6=i
N→∞→ tr
(
Ri,1,pRˆj,p,p
)
tr−1
(
Rˆj,p,p
)
, (27c)
7¯˜ai
N→∞→ tr
(
Ri,1,1 R˜
(1)
i,1,1
)
tr−1
(
Rˆi,1,1
)
, (27d)
a¯1i
N→∞→ tr (Ri,1,1 Ω) tr−1 (Ω) , (27e)
a¯i
N→∞→
[
τ2PI |tr (Ωi)|2 + tr
(
Ri,1,1R˜
(1)
i
)]
tr−1
(
Rˆi
)
,
(27f)
¯ˆai
N→∞→
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
Pp,j a¯
(p)
i,j . (27g)
b¯i,p
N→∞→[
τ2φPE
∣∣tr (Γ¯i,p)∣∣2 + tr(R1,pR˜(2)i,p,p)] tr−1 (Rˆi,p,p) ,
(28a)
b¯j 6=i,p
N→∞→ tr
(
R1,p Rˆj,p,p
)
tr−1
(
Rˆj,p,p
)
, (28b)
b¯
N→∞→ tr (R1,1 Ω) tr−1 (Ω) , (28c)
b¯i
N→∞→
[
τ2φPE
∣∣tr (Ω¯i)∣∣2 + tr(R1,1R˜(2)i )] tr−1 (Rˆi) ,
(28d)
¯ˆ
bi
N→∞→
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
Pp,j b
′′
j,p, (28e)
where
Γi,p = Ri,1,pCp,i, R˜
(1)
i,p,p = Rˆi,p,p − τ2PICp,iRi,1,pCHp,i,
Ω = τ2(1− φ)PER1,1 + τσ2nIN ,
Ωi = Ri,1,1Ci, R˜
(1)
i = Rˆi − τ2PICiRi,1,1CHi ,
Γ¯i,p = R1,pCp,i, R˜
(2)
i,p,p = Rˆi,p,p − τ2φPECp,iR1,pCHp,i,
Ω¯i = R1,1Ci, R˜
(2)
i = Rˆi − τ2φPECiR1,1CHi . (29)
The expected values of the average received powers of the
normalized transmit signals at the legitimate antenna of the
EH when attacking IU1,i (in (22)) asymptomatically converge
to definite values as in (30). For notational convenience, we
define E[{|b˜j,p|2, |b˜|2, |b˜i|2, |b¨i|2}] = {¯˜bj,p, ¯˜b, ¯˜bi, ¯¨bi}.
The detailed derivations of these asymptomatic values are in
Appendix C.
¯˜
bj,p
N→∞→ tr
(
R1,pRˆj,p,p
)
tr−1
(
Rˆj,p,p
)
, (30a)
¯˜
b
N→∞→ [τ2(1− φ)PE tr2 (R1,1) + τσ2ntr (R1,1)] tr−1 (Ω) ,
(30b)
¯˜
bi
N→∞→ tr
(
R1,1 Rˆi
)
tr−1
(
Rˆi
)
, (30c)
¯¨
bi
N→∞→
L∑
p=2
M∑
j=1
Pp,j
¯˜
bj,p. (30d)
IV. DOWNLINK POWER ALLOCATION OPTIMISATION
A. Information-Untrusted EH
For the information-untrusted EH case, the power con-
trol aims to optimize the downlink information, energy and
AN signal transmit powers at the reference cell, {P1,i}, P
and Pn, to maximize the worst-case ESR, miniRSi , while
maintaining a minimum level of the worst-case AHE, E¯,
miniEi ({P1,j}, P, Pn) ≥ E¯ and the total transmit power
is within the available budget. Therefore, the corresponding
optimisation problem can be formulated as4
maximize
{P1,j}, P, Pn
min
i
RSi
subject to Ei ({P1,j}, P, Pn) ≥ E¯, ∀i, (31a)
M∑
j=1
P1,j + P + Pn ≤ Pt. (31b)
Within the available power budget Pt, the power allocation
among {P1,j}, P and Pn is optimized at the reference cell,
while we assume that there is no central power control
among multiple cells. For simplicity we assume uniform power
allocation at the interfering cells, i.e., Pp,i = PtM , ∀ p, ∀ i.
The power control problem (31) is feasible if there exist
power allocation sets {P1,i}, P and Pn satisfy the constraints
(31a) and (31b).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the problem in
(31) is feasible and focus on solving it. It can be seen that the
objective function in (31) is a complicated nonconvex function
since it consists of logarithm of product of fractional functions,
mini log2[(1 + SINRIi)/(1 + SINREi)], while the constraints
(31a) and (31b) are convex since they are linear in terms
of the optimization variables. The objective function can be
convexified as follows. First, using (13), (15), (17), (19) and
certain logarithmic properties, we can replace the objective
function miniRSi in (31) with the monotonically increasing
expression, miniR′′Si = mini[(1 + SINRIi)/(1 + SINREi)],
given in (32)5 at the top of the next page. Second, the new
objective expression miniR′′Si is still nonconvex, therefore,
we use exponential variable substitution method [23], [32],
[33] to convert miniR′′Si into an equivalent linear expression
as follows: Let us substitute the multiplicative terms in the
denominators and numerators in (32) by exponential slack
variables:
eui = P1,i
(
a¯
(1)
i,i +
¯˜ai
)
+
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j
+ P a¯1i + Pn a¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n, ∀ i, (34a)
esi = P1,i¯˜ai +
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pna¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n, ∀ i,
(34b)
eti = P1,i b¯i,1 + P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ
2
n, ∀ i, (34c)
evi = P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ
2
n, ∀ i. (34d)
Using the previous substitutions and some of the logarithmic
and exponential properties, we can write the objective function
as mini (ui − si − ti + vi). To keep the maximization of our
4Considering the worst-case scenario is relevant since the EH can attack
any IU.
5Since the logarithmic and exponential functions are monotonically increas-
ing in their arguments, i.e., f(x1) > f(x2), implies that log2(f(x1)) >
log2(f(x2)) and ef(x1) > ef(x2). Therefore, argmaxx log2(f(x)) =
argmaxx f(x) and argmaxx ef(x) = argmaxx f(x).
8min
i
R′′Si = mini
(
P1,i
(
a¯
(1)
i,i +
¯˜ai
)
+
∑M
j 6=i P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pna¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
)(
P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ
2
n
)
(
P1,i ¯˜ai +
∑M
j 6=i P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pna¯i +
¯ˆai + σ2n
)(
P1,i b¯i,1 + P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ2n
) (32)
R′′i =
∏
i
(1 + SINRIi) =
∏
i
(
P1,i
(
a¯
(1)
i,i +
¯˜ai
)
+
∑M
j 6=i P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pn a¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
)
(
P1,i ¯˜ai +
∑M
j 6=i P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pn a¯i +
¯ˆai + σ2n
) (33)
objective bounded, we have to ensure that the slack variables
ui, si, ti and vi are within the values of their substituted
expressions in (34a)–(34d), respectively. Therefore, (31) is
recast as
maximize
{P1,j}, P, Pn,
{ui,si,ti,vi}
min
i
(ui − si − ti + vi)
subject to
P1,i
(
a¯
(1)
i,i +
¯˜ai
)
+
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pn a¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
≥ eui , ∀ i, (35a)
P1,i ¯˜ai +
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i + Pn a¯i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
≤ es¯i (si − s¯i + 1) , ∀ i, (35b)
P1,i b¯i,1 + P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ
2
n ≤ et¯i (ti − t¯i + 1) , ∀ i
(35c)
P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi + σ
2
n ≥ evi , ∀ i, (35d)
(31a), (31b). (35e)
In constraints (35b) and (35c), esi and eti are linearized
as esi = es¯i (si − s¯i + 1) and eti = et¯i (ti − t¯i + 1) to
avoid having convex downward function being bounded below,
where s¯i and t¯i are the points around which the linearizations
are made. Now, the reformulated problem (35) is convex
and can be solved iteratively using any convex optimization
software such as CVX [34]. After each iteration, the values
of s¯i and t¯i (which are initialized for the first iteration) are
updated by the optimized values of si and ti, respectively.
The iterative optimization process continues until the errors
{|si − s¯i|} and {|ti − t¯i|} fall below a certain tolerance.
B. Information-Trusted EH
For information-trusted EH, the power control aims to
optimize the downlink information and energy signal transmit
powers at the reference cell, {P1,i} and P , to maximize
the ergodic sum-rate,
∑
iRi, while maintaining the total
transmit power ≤ Pt and a minimum level of the AHE, E¯,
EM({P1,j}, P, Pn) ≥ E¯, where EM is the AHE by the EH
when attacking the IUs whose indices are specified by M.
The right-hand side expression in (21) is valid to calculate
EM (i ∼ M, i.e., attacking the M IUs instead of attacking
IU1,i). Therefore, the corresponding optimisation problem can
be formulated as6
maximize
{P1,j}, P
∑
i
Ri
subject to EM ≥ E¯, ∀i, (36a)
M∑
j=1
P1,j + P ≤ Pt. (36b)
To convexify (36), we follow comparable steps to those used
to reformulate problem (31) in the previous subsection. Using
(13)–(15) and some logarithmic properties, we can replace∑
iRi in the objective function of (36) with the monotonically
increasing expression, R′′i =
∏
i (1 + SINRIi), given in (33).
Then, by applying exponential variable substitution as in the
previous subsection, we can recast (36) as in (37)
maximize
{P1,j}, P1, {ui,si}
∑
i
(ui − si)
subject to
P1,i
(
a¯
(1)
i,i +
¯˜ai
)
+
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
≥ eui , ∀i, (37a)
P1,i ¯˜ai +
∑
j 6=i
P1,j a¯
(1)
i,j + P a¯1i +
¯ˆai + σ
2
n
≤ es¯i (si − s¯i + 1) , ∀ i, (37b)
(36a), (36b). (37c)
Problem (37) is feasible and can be solved iteratively in
the same fashion as the problem in problem (35). In the
next section, we analyze the complexity of our proposed
algorithms.
V. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The computational complexity of the downlink transmission
is related to the complexities of evaluating the asymptotic
values in (27)-(30) which are dominated by the N×N matrix
multiplication which has an O (N3) asymptotic complexity
[35], and the complexity of the power allocation optimization.
The complexity of problems (35) and (37) depends on the
number of constraints, optimization variables and the size of
the input data of the optimization problems in thier standard
linear programming (LP) forms. Note that the solvers that are
6Considering the ergodic sum-rate maximization problem is relevant since
the EH can harvest energy from all IUs signals. In addition, AN jamming is
not taken (Pn = 0) since the EH is information-trusted.
9based on symmetric primal-dual interior-point algorithm (such
as those supported by CVX software like SDPT3 and SeDuMi)
do not support constraints that involve entropy family function
like the exponential function eui in (35) [34], [36], [37]. There-
fore, all the exponential functions are linearized internally by
the optimization software solver as eui = eu¯i(ui − u¯i + 1),
evi = ev¯i(vi−v¯i+1), ∀i. u¯i and v¯i are the points around which
the linearization are made. To calculate the complexity of per-
iteration problem for the formulation in (35), we need to recast
(35) in a standard LP form by rewriting the min operator in the
objective function mini (ui − si − ti + vi). This can be done
by replacing the objective function with new slack variable π
and introducing the constraint (ui − si − ti + vi) ≥ π, ∀ i.
Therefore, (35) will be
(Pst) : maximize{P1,j}, P, Pn,
{ui,si,ti,vi}, π
π (38a)
subject to (ui − si − ti + vi) ≥ π, ∀ i, (38b)
(35a)− (35e). (38c)
With the LP formulation in (38) (which is equivalent to
(35)), we follow the procedure described in Chapter 6 in
[38] to calculate the computational complexity of finding a
solution for (35) within an accuracy ǫ in terms of the following
parameters: number of the real design variables, nv = 5M+3;
total number of per-scalar value constraints, nc = 6M + 1;
the 1-norm of the input data vector, ‖data(Pst)‖1, data(Pst) =
[nv, nc, [u¯1, s¯1, t¯1, v¯1; . . . ; u¯M , s¯M , t¯M , v¯M ], σ
2
n, Pt, E¯];
and total number of input data, dim data(Pst) = 4M + 5.
Having these parameters, with O (1) complexity per real
operation, the complexity of getting a solution for Pst within
an accuracy ǫ, is [38]
Comp (Pst, ǫ) = (nv + nc)
3
2 n2v
× ln
(
dim Data (Psub) + ‖Data (Psub)‖1 + ǫ2
ǫ
)
. (39)
The result in (39) has an asymptotic complexity of
O
(
M
7
2
[
ln(M) + ln( 1
ǫ
)
])
. The optimization complexity does
not depend on the number of transmit antenna N since the
optimization is per user signal power.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND EVALUATIONS
This section provides numerical examples to demonstrate
the system asymptotic performance. In our simulations, the
system parameters are selected as follows: the number of
transmit antennas per cell is N = 512, the number of cells
is L = 3 and the number of IUs per cell is M = 3. Both
the IUs and the EH are assumed to have 30 dB path-loss to
their local BSs which corresponds to γ1 = 10−3, and 70 dB
path-loss to the neighbouring cell BSs, which corresponds to
γ2 = 10
−7
. The variance of the thermal noise at all users and
the BSs’ receivers is σ2n = 10−3. The correlation matrices,
RI and RE , are generated using the Truncated Laplacian PAS
model which is suitable for the outdoor macrocell environment
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Fig. 1. E-RS regions versus the training power splitting
factor.
[39], with a mean AoA varying randomly for different users
across the interval [−π, π]. The total power budget at every
BS is Pt = 1W . The energy harvesting efficiency is dependent
on the incident power range at the receving antennas [40],
accordingly, it is assumed to be equal for all EHs as ζ = 0.5,
and this is reasonable for the expected incident power range
from −5 dBm to 5 dBm. The average training signal power
per user is fixed at PI = PE = 1 W .
To demonstrate the performance of the jointly optimized
worst-case ESR, miniRSi , and worst-case AHE, miniEi, we
use the energy-secrecy (E-RS) region plot which shows the
optimal miniRSi against the constraint on miniEi, E¯. For
no constraint on the worst-case AHE, E¯ = 0, the BS has the
freedom to optimize the information, AN and energy signal
transmissions such that miniRSi is at its maximum. Con-
versely, as E¯ increases, more power is devoted to satisfy the
worst-case AHE constraint, miniEi ≥ E¯, until miniRSi = 0
at the end of the E-RS region. Therefore, the larger the area
under the E-RS region the better the performance.
Fig. 1 shows a 3-D plot representing the E-RS regions
obtained by solving (35) at different values of φ. Generally,
during the intervals of low worst-case AHE constraints, the
E-RS regions show no tradeoff between miniRSi and miniEi,
i.e., the received information and AN signals are sufficient to
provide the EH with the required worst-case AHE. As the
worst-case AHE constraints increase, the BS trades some of
the secrecy performance for satisfying the AHE constraints.
As expected, the optimized worst-case ESR decreases as E¯
increases.
Fig. 2 compares the asymptotic E-RS region (at
φ = 0.2) obtained by solving (35) using the asymptotic
values of {a¯(1)i,i , a¯(p)i,j , ¯˜ai, a¯1i , a¯i, ¯ˆai}, {b¯i,p, b¯, b¯i, ¯ˆbi}
and {¯˜bj,p, ¯˜b, ¯˜bi, ¯¨bi}, with the E-RS region obtained
by solving (35) using the simulation average values
of {a¯(1)i,i , a¯(p)i,j , ¯˜ai, a¯1i , a¯i, ¯ˆai}, {b¯i,p, b¯, b¯i, ¯ˆbi} and
{¯˜bj,p, ¯˜b, ¯˜bi, ¯¨bi}. The results give an insight into the accuracy
of our asymptotic analysis. Fig. 3 compares the asymptotic
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splitting factor, E¯ = 60 mW .
and the simulation performances of worst-case ESR versus
training power splitting factor, φ. AS expected, the worst-case
ESR decreases as φ increases.
For the information-trusted EH case, similar to the E-RS
region, we use the energy-rate (E-R) region which defines
the tradeoff between the AHE (EM), and the ergodic sum-
rate,
∑
iRi by solving (37). We assume two scenarios of
information-trusted EH case: in the first scenario, the reference
BS is able to detect the active eavesdropping attack and to
identify the attacker, the EH, therefore, EM is calculated
by (21); in the second scenario, the reference BS is able
to detect the active eavesdropping attack, however, it can
not identify the attacker, therefore, EM is calculated as
EM = ζ(
∑
j P1,j
¯˜
bj,p + P
¯˜
b+ Pn
¯˜
bi +
¯¨
bi), where i ∼M. Fig.
4 demonstrates the E-R regions for both scenarios, the identi-
fied and the unidentified attacker, for the following parameters:
two sets of attacked IUs, M = 1 and M = {1, 2, 3}; and
φ = 0.2, 0.8. In the first sub-plot, (a), the EH attacks one IUs,
IU1,1. The tradeoff between the ergodic sum-rate and the AHE
is clear as expected, where the ergodic sum-rate decreases as
the AHE constraint increases. However, the performance gap
between the identified and unidentified attacker scenarios is
small. In the second sub-plot, (b), in which the EH attacks
multiple IUs, M = {1, 2, 3}, it can be noticed that identify-
ing the attacker by the BS can help in improving the worst-
case ergodic sum-rate, particularly at low AHE constraints
region. The third sub-plot, (c), emphasizes the performance
gap between the identified and unidentified attacker scenarios.
For example, at φ = 0.8, identifying the attacker will gain
5 b/s/Hz in the ergodic sum-rate performance for a AHE of
20 mW .
In Fig. 5, we demonstrate the energy harvesting performance
of the EH. The figure focuses on the effect of balancing
the limited training power between the legitimate energy
harvesting, (1 − φ)PE , and harvesting energy through eaves-
dropping, φPE , on the total AHE by the EH. At small
power splitting factors (as φ = 0.1), most of the training
power is invested in the legitimate channel estimation and
therefore most of the harvested energy is via the signal aligned
to the legitimate channel g1. Increasing the eavesdropping
training power (by increasing φ) results in an increase in
the AHE dominated by the average harvested energy from
the legitimate signal ζ(
∑
j P1,j
¯˜
bj,p + P
¯˜
b+ Pn
¯˜
bi +
¯¨
bi) and
the average harvested energy from the eavesdropped signal
ζ(
∑
j P1,j b¯j,p + P b¯+ Pnb¯i +
¯ˆ
bi) until a point φ⋆—the point
corresponding to the maximum harvested energy—beyond
which the harvested energy decreases with increasing φ. φ⋆
gives the optimal balance between the legitimate and the
eavesdropping training power for maximizing the AHE.
Fig. 6 shows the achievable worst-case ESR versus the
number of transmit antennas which varies over the range
N = [5, 20, 50, 100, 300, . . . , 1700]. As expected, as the
number of transmit antennas increases, the worst-case ESR
increases.
Fig. 7 shows the convergence speed of the power allocation
iterative LP problem in (37). Since the iterative process is
based on updating the initial values of Taylor first order
approximations {s¯i} in (37b), therefore, the convergence speed
is affected by the choice of the initial values {s¯i}. Intuitively,
the initial values can be calculated with the following formula
s¯i =
log

Pt − PnM + 1

¯˜ai +
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
a¯
(1)
i,j

+ P a¯1i + ¯ˆai + σ2n

 , ∀i.
(40)
In (40), we assume uniform power allocation among the
information and energy signals. Good initial value approx-
imations can be found via one-dimensional search across
0 ≤ P ≤ Pt. Fig. 7 shows the convergence of the ergodic
sum-rate per iteration with the initial values generated by (39)
with P = 0.1, 0.3 W , M = 1 and at a point within the
tradeoff region corresponding to E¯ = 80 mW . The results
in the figure show different convergence speeds for different
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initializations. For the initialization with P = 0.1 W , the
iterative algorithm converges to its final optimal objective after
5 iterations, while via the initialization with P = 0.3 W , the
iterative algorithm reaches its final optimal objective after 3
iterations.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We optimized the downlink transmission for SWIPT to
maximize the worst-case ESR of the IUs under a constraint on
worst-case AHE by the active two antennas EH in multi-cell
massive MIMO systems. The EH has the potential to harvest
energy via one antenna and to eavesdrop an information signal
via the other antenna. The considered problems were: 1) The
maximisation of the worst-case ESR under a constraint on
the worst-case AHE by the EH for the case of information-
untrusted EH; 2) The maximisation of the ergodic sum-rate
of the IUs under a constraint on the worst-case AHE by
the EH for the case of information-untrusted EH. Asymptotic
expressions for ergodic sum-rate, ESR and AHE were derived
in a large system limit. Then, we used these results to
optimize power allocation for downlink SWIPT transmissions
which include: information signals, AN and energy signal
towards the IUs, legitimate and illegitimate antennas of the
EH, respectively. Our results demonstrate the performances of
SWIPT over the E-RS and E-R tradeoff regions. Also, the
impact of the combined legitimate/illegitimate operation of
the EH on the SWIPT performance has been investigated.
Considering the same problem for multi-antenna users and
cell-free scenario is left as a further work.
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APPENDIX A
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Given that {ρ(Ri,l,1), ρ(R1,1)} ≤ c ≤ ∞ and by using
Corollary 1, we have
h˜
H
i,l,1R
1
2
i,l,1R
1
2
i,p,1h˜i,p,1
N→∞→
{
tr (Ri,p,1) , for l = p
0, for l 6= p . (41)
Therefore, by expanding the product yH1,iyH1,i using (4) fol-
lowed by applying Corollary 1, we get
[
yH1,iy1,i
] N→∞→{
τ2PI
∑L
l=1 tr (Ri,l,1) + τ
2PE tr (R1,1) +Nτσ2n, i ∈M
τ2PI
∑L
l=1 tr (Ri,l,1) +Nτσ
2
n, i /∈M
,
(42)
and
yH1,iy1,i − τ2PI
∑
t tr (Ri,t,1) +Nτσ
2
n
τ2tr (R1,1)
N→∞→{
φ1PE , i /∈M
0, i /∈M .
(43)
This concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The correlation matrix R1,p belongs to the family of Hermi-
tian Toeplitz matrices and is defined as R1,p = RN (rm,n) =
[rm,n = rm−n; m,n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1],
RN =


r1−1 r1−2 ... r1−N
r2−1 r2−2 ...
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
rN−1 ... rN−N

 , (44)
where the correlation coefficients rm,n are generated using the
truncated Laplacian model7 [39]
rm,n (d, φ0) =
∫ π
−π
γt e
j2pi(m−n)d sin(φ−φ0)
λ P¯ (φ− φ0) dφ,
(45)
d is the spacing between successive antennas, j =
√−1 (for
this equation only), λ is the signal wavelength, φ is the angle
of arrival (AoA) of the signal path, φ0 is the mean AoA over
all signal paths and it varies from one user to another, P¯ (φ−
φ0) is the power angular spectrum which follows a truncated
Laplacian distribution. By making use of Lemma 4.1 in [41],
the spectral radius of the Hermitian Toeplitz matrix RN (rm,n)
is upper bounded by the supremum of the generating function
ρ (RN (rm,n)) ≤ sup rm,n (d, φ0) . (46)
Knowing that for truncated Laplacian distribution∫ π
−π P¯ (φ − φ0)dφ = 1, sup rm,n(d, φ0) is found by the
extreme case of signal autocorrelation at one antenna, i.e., at
n = m. Therefore, sup rm,n(d, φ0) = rm,n=m(d, φ0) = γ1
and then
7We assume a uniformly linear antenna array with a truncated range of
AoA [−pi, pi].
ρ (RN (rm,n)) ≤ γ1. (47)
The spectral boundedness of Ri,l,p can be proved by fol-
lowing the same steps. This concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Let us put Cp,i as
√
PIRi,p,p(Bi + σ
2
nIN )
−1
. By making use
of the eigenvalue decomposition definition, it is easy to verify
that ρ(Bi + σ2nIN ) ≥ σ2n, and therefore, the matrix inverse
imposes that ρ(Bi + σ2nIN )−1 ≤ 1σ2n . Since ρ(Ri,p,p) ≤ c ≤ ∞,
where c is a positive real constant, then, by applying Lemma
3 we have
ρ (Cp,i) ≤ c ≤ ∞. (48)
The proof of ρ (Ci) ≤ c ≤ ∞ can be done in a comparable
way. This concludes the proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
By making use of Corollary 11 in [42] (which relates
the spectral radius of product of matrices to their individual
spectral radii), we have
ρ
(∏
m
Am
)
≤
∏
m
ρ (Am) . (49)
Since {Am} is of a finite length and ρ(Am) <∞, ∀ m, then
ρ(
∏
mAm) ≤
∏
m ρ(Am) <∞. This concludes the proof.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
Defining I = {i} × {j}, we have
E
[∣∣xHAy∣∣2] = E


∣∣∣∣∣
∑
I
xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jyj
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 =
∑
I
E
[∣∣∣xHi ΘHi AΘ¯jyj∣∣∣2
]
+
∑
I×I
{i,j}6={m,n}
E
[〈
xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jyj , x
H
mΘ
H
mAΘ¯nyn
〉]
,
(50)
E
[∣∣∣xHi ΘHi AΘ¯jyj∣∣∣2
]
= xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jE
[
yjy
H
j
]
Θ¯
H
j A
H
Θixi
= xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jΘ¯
H
j A
H
Θixi
N→∞→ tr
(
Θ
H
i AΘ¯jΘ¯
H
j A
H
Θi
)
,
(51)
E
[〈
xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jyj , x
H
mΘ
H
mAΘ¯nyn
〉]
= xHi Θ
H
i AΘ¯jE
[
yjy
H
n
]
Θ¯
H
n A
H
Θmxm
N→∞→ 0. (52)
The expectations are moved to yjyHj and yjyHn in (51)
and (52) based on the statistical independence between yj
and xi; and between yjyHn and {xi, xm}, respectively. The
asymptotic convergences in (51) and (52) follow by applying
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Corollary 1. Base on (50)–(52) and some trace and Cartesian
product properties, we have
E
[∣∣xHAy∣∣2] N→∞→ tr(ΘHi AΘ¯jΘ¯Hj AHΘi)
= tr
[
A
(∑
I
Θ¯jΘ¯
H
j ΘiΘ
H
i
)
AH
]
= tr

A

∑
j
Θ¯jΘ¯
H
j

(∑
i
ΘiΘ
H
i
)
AH


= tr
(
A E
[
yyH
]
E
[
xxH
]
AH
)
. (53)
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We assume that the EH has full knowledge of the IUs’
beamforming vectors {wj,1} and its own channels {gE1 , g1};
and is able to cancel the intra-cell interference. This results in
an upper bound on the EH ergodic rate. Moreover, the IUs’
signals {xj,p}, the AN signal z, the energy signal w, and the
noise at the eavesdropping antenna of the EH are independent.
As a result, given (16), we have following upper bound on the
ergodic rate of the EH
R¯Ei = E
[
log2
(
1 + SINREi
)]
, (54)
where
SINREi =
P1,i |bi,1|2
P |b|2 + Pn|bi|2 + E
[∣∣∣bˆi∣∣∣2
]
+ σ2n
. (55)
By concavity of log(1 + x) and using Jensen’s inequality,
we obtain
R¯Ei ≤ REi = log2
(
1 + E[SINREi ]
)
. (56)
Using the multivariate Taylor expansion,
E[SINREi ] = E[Xi/Yi], where Xi = P1,i|bi,1|2 and
Yi = P |b|2 + Pn|bi|2 + E[|bˆi|2] + σ2n, can be expanded
as [43]
E[SINREi ]
= E
[
Xi
Yi
]
=
E[Xi]
E[Yi]
− cov(Xi, Yi)
(E[Yi])2
+
var(Yi)E[Xi]
(E[Yi])3
+R.
(57)
where R = f(var(Yi), cov(Xi, Yi)) is the reminder of se-
ries expansion and is very small. Since bi,1, b and bi are
statistically independent, then, cov(Xi, Y i) = 0. Moreover,
according to Lemma 5 (see (50) and (52) in the proof of
Lemma 5), var({|b|2, |bi|2}) N→∞→ 0, which implies that
var(Yi), var(R)
N→∞→ 0. Therefore, E[SINREi ] asymptotically
converges as
E[SINREi ]
N→∞→ E[Xi]
E[Yi]
=
P1,iE
[
|bi,1|2
]
PE [|b|2] + PnE [|bi|2] + E
[∣∣∣bˆi∣∣∣2
]
+ σ2n
, SINREi . (58)
Finally, by replacing E[SINREi ] by SINREi in (56) above,
we obtain the upper bound on the EH ergodic rate in (18).
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF THE ASYMPTOTIC RECEIVED SIGNAL
POWERS
We have∥∥∥hˆj,p,p∥∥∥ = (hˆHj,p,phˆj,p,p) 12 = (yHp,jCHp,jCp,jyp,j) 12
N→∞→ tr 12
(
Rˆj,p,p
)
.
(59)
The second equality in (59) follows from substituting hˆj,p,p
by its value in (3), while the last asymptotic convergence
is determined by expanding the product yHp,jCHp,jCp,jyp,j
followed by applying Lemmas 2-4 and Corollary 1. Given
that IU1,i is the attacked IU, using (3), (6) and (13), a(p)i,i can
be expanded as
a
(p)
i,i = h
T
i,1,pwi,p
= hTi,1,p
(
τ
√
PIC
∗
p,ih
∗
i,1,p + h˜
(1)
i,p,p
)∥∥∥hˆi,p,p∥∥∥−1
N→∞→ τ
√
PI
tr (Cp,iRi,1,p)
tr
1
2
(
Rˆi,p,p
) + hTi,1,ph˜(1)i,p,p
tr
1
2
(
Rˆi,p,p
) ,
(60)
where
h˜
(1)
i,p,p = hˆ
∗
i,p,p − τ
√
PIC
∗
p,ih
∗
i,1,p, (61)
provided that the matrix Cp,iRi,1,p has bounded spectral radius
according to Lemmas 2–4. The asymptotic convergence in
(60) follows from applying Corollary 1 which implies that
hTi,1,pC
∗
p,ih
∗
i,1,p is independent from the small fading random-
ness of hi,1,p and converges to the definite value tr(Cp,iRi,1,p).
Therefore,
E
[
a
(p)
i,i
]
N→∞→ τ
√
PI
tr (Cp,iRi,1,p)
tr
1
2
(
Rˆi,p,p
) + E
[
hTi,1,ph˜
(1)
i,p,p
]
tr
1
2
(
Rˆi,p,p
)
N→∞→ τ
√
PI tr (Cp,iRi,1,p) tr−
1
2
(
Rˆi,p,p
)
.
(62)
The second asymptotic convergence in (62) follows from (59)
and the fact that hTi,1,ph˜
(1)
i,p,p is a zero mean random variable
(this is because the vectors {h˜i,l,p}, gEp and Npψ∗i are of zero
mean).
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E
[|a˜i|2] = var(a(1)i,i ) = E
[∣∣∣a(1)i,i − E [a(1)i,i ]∣∣∣2
]
N→∞→ E
[∣∣∣hTi,1,1h˜(1)i,1,1∣∣∣2
]
tr−1
(
Rˆi,1,1
)
N→∞→ tr
(
Ri,1,1R˜
(1)
i,1,1
)
tr−1
(
Rˆi,1,1
)
.
(63)
The first asymptotic convergence in (63) results from substi-
tuting the values of a(1)i,i and E[a
(1)
i,i ] provided in (60) and (62).
The second asymptotic convergence follows from applying
Lemma 5.
For j 6= i, vector wj,p is a summation of L+2 linearly trans-
formed statistically independent vectors which are independent
of hi,1,p. In addition, according to Lemmas 2–4, matrices
E[wj,pw
H
j,p] = Rˆj,p,p|hˆj,p,p|−2 and Ri,1,p and their product are
of bounded spectral radii. Therefore, Lemma 5 can be applied
to calculate E[|a(p)i,j 6=i|2] as follows
E
[∣∣∣a(p)i,j 6=i∣∣∣2
]
N→∞
=
[∣∣∣hHi,1,p wj,p∣∣∣2
]
N→∞
N→∞→ tr
(
Ri,1,p Rˆj,p,p
)
tr−1
(
Rˆj,p,p
)
.
(64)
The details of achieving the asymptotically converged
values {a¯1i , a¯i, ¯ˆai}, {b¯i,p, b¯j 6=i,p, b¯, b¯i, ¯ˆbi} and
{¯˜bj,p, ¯˜b, ¯˜bi, ¯¨bi} in (27e)–(27g), (28a)–(28e) and (30a)–
(30d), respectively, are similar to the analysis of obtaining
{E[a(p)i,i ], E[|a˜i]|2, E[|a(p)i,j 6=i|2]} previously described. There-
fore, due to space limitation, their detailed derivations are
omitted.
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